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Abstract
Recent research revealed evidence on additional tasks and wider responsibilities of 
management accountants. The aim of this study is to analyze a possible involvement of 
management accountants in the field of incentive compensation. More specifically, two 
research questions are investigated: (i) to what extent are management accountants involved 
in design and operation of incentive compensation systems, and (ii) has the involvement of 
management accountants in incentive compensation a positive impact on the effects of 
incentive compensation and subsequently firm performance?  
 We employ the partial least squares approach as structural equation modeling technique 
and survey data gathered from German management accountants and general managers to 
answer our research questions. The results suggest that management accountants are indeed 
involved in design and operation of incentive compensation systems and that this involvement 
is beneficial for the desired effects of incentive compensation systems as well as for firm 
performance. 
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1 Introduction 
The relevance lost statement of Johnson and Kaplan (1987) triggered a debate on new 
management accounting techniques and changing roles of management accountants. In the 
course of the discussion how to regain relevance a considerable body of literature on changing 
tasks and roles of management accountants evolved in recent years. A substantial strand of 
this literature suggests that management accountants should extent their tasks and should be 
more involved in operational and strategic decision making processes. 
 Empirical research initiatives in this field addressed, for instance, the different roles and 
responsibilities of management accountants. Research approaches vary and comprise case-
based or interview-based research (e.g., Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2005; Granlund and Taipaleenmäki, 2005), survey research (e.g., Mouritsen, 1996; Indjejikian 
and Matjka, 2006), or hybrid approaches combining, for instance, survey with field evidence 
(e.g., Emsley, 2005; Maas and Matjka, 2009). In this discussion, one of the most popular 
aspects is the change of management accountants’ roles from ‘bean counter’-type to more 
‘advisor’-type roles (e.g., Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005). Despite this amount of research on changing tasks and wider 
responsibilities, there is ample room for studies immersing those findings and investigating 
the effects of an involvement of management accountants in activities beyond their traditional 
tasks. However, research in this context is still scarce with but few exceptions. For instance, 
the study of Zoni and Merchant (2007) measures and analyzes possible effects of an 
involvement of management accountants in managerial decision making; and Ferreira and 
Moulang (2009) focus on the effects of an involvement of management accountants in 
strategic management processes. 
 Against this background we decided to explore activities of management accountants 
related to incentive compensation in more detail to pursue the stream of literature on extended 
responsibilities of management accountants. We address especially two research questions. 
First, to what extent are management accountants involved in design and operation of 
incentive compensation systems? Second, has the involvement of management accountants in 
incentive compensation a positive impact on the effects of incentive compensation and 
subsequently firm performance? 
 We selected incentive compensation systems since (a) they take a special position to 
ensure that organizational objectives are achieved and (b) management accountants are 
already partly involved in design and operation of those systems since they provide relevant 
information, i.e., performance measures. It is key for organizations that suitable performance 
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measures are designed, that the incentive compensation system itself is properly configured, 
and foremost that the incentive compensation systems are aligned with other controls of the 
organization. This is of high importance since inappropriate performance measures or 
inadequate designed incentive compensation can trigger dysfunctional managerial behavior. 
In this context, management accountants may contribute and reduce the risk of dysfunctional 
effects. But, beyond their core tasks as information provider, management accountants might 
also be involved in other responsibilities such as designing incentive functions or specifying 
remuneration packages, e.g., regarding the percentage of performance-dependent pay. 
Furthermore, we chose incentive compensation since findings on those aspects are from a 
management accounting perspective, e.g., on how incentive compensation is embedded in 
control systems and performance measurement, still scarce (e.g., Berry et al., 2009: 5) and 
empirical management accounting studies mainly emphasize decision making rather than 
control aspects (e.g., Otley, 2003: 324; Zimmerman, 2001: 424). 
 In our study, we derive a theoretical model and test it with empirical data gathered from 
German management accountants and general managers from a cross-sectional survey. This 
approach is consistent with the call for more management problem-based research and for a 
stronger focus on management accounting practice (Otley, 2001; Merchant et al., 2003: 251). 
Thus, our study intends to contribute to management accounting research by providing further 
evidence on the avenue of regaining relevance. More specifically, our study should contribute 
to the growing stream of literature on management accountants’ roles in organizations. We 
aim for providing evidence that management accountants are increasingly involved in wider 
responsibilities, i.e., in our case incentive compensation, and that those extended tasks and 
roles are beneficial for organizations. Whereas a large part of empirical literature in this field 
applies case-based research approaches (e.g., Hopper, 1980; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Byrne and Pierce, 2007) or exhibits only smaller sample sizes (e.g., Zoni and Merchant, 2007) 
we are able to further contribute to literature by relying on a comparatively large dyadic data 
set. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section derives the 
theoretical basis: we review relevant literature, specify our hypotheses, and set up the research 
model. Section 3 describes the research design, the sample, employed variables, and the 
econometric procedures we apply to analyze our model. This is followed by details and 
findings of our study in Section 4. We conclude our work in Section 5 with final remarks and 
suggestions of directions for future research. 
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2 Related literature and hypotheses 
This section comprises three parts. The first part derives the tasks and roles of management 
accountants with a special focus on ongoing changes of the profession. The second part 
develops the involvement of management accountants in incentive compensation based on the 
postulated advent of extended management accountants’ responsibilities. The third part is 
devoted to the development of our research model and the corresponding hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Extended tasks and roles of management accountants 
The two main functions of management accounting systems are to facilitate managerial 
decision making and to alleviate control problems in organizations (e.g., Baiman and Demski, 
1980; Demski and Feltham, 1976; Zimmerman, 2006: 2-5). Tasks of management accountants 
(or controllers as they are also denoted)1 can be deducted from those two functions. 
Management accountants have to provide relevant information and to design controls in order 
to allow appropriate economic decisions and to induce actions in the interest of the 
organization. In this regard, they support managers in their activities to enhance business 
performance (Weber and Schäffer, 2008: 19f.; Zimmerman, 2006: 13-14). 
 Management accountants are recognized as specialists in the area of accounting and 
typically have in addition sound knowledge on the activities of the organization’s business 
(Maas and Hartmann, 2009: 7; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998: 362-3). Such expertise 
basically allows them to procure and to distribute appropriate information to management. 
This is an important aspect since access and availability of relevant information is one of the 
focal success factors for organizations in competitive business environments (Mangaliso, 
1995; Porter and Millar, 1985). Nevertheless, management accountants do not only provide 
information to management; they do also provide fiduciary information for financial reporting 
purposes. Especially recent developments in financial reporting like the increasing importance 
of the management approach require more internal information to be disclosed in the firm’s 
financial statements (e.g., Berger and Hann, 2003). For instance, the International Financial 
Reporting Standard 8 on segment reporting requires the identification of segments according 
to internal reports or a description on the definition of internal key performance indicators. 
Thus, management accountants become co-responsible for the firm’s financial statements and 
                                                 
1  In this paper we only use the term ‘management accountant’. We do also follow this 
terminology in those cases where the original reference applies the term ‘controller’. 
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should, at least to a certain extent, bear responsibility for financial accounting information and 
disclosure. 
 Beside this role embracing book-keeping and the responsibility as a provider of 
(advanced) management accounting information, a second role can be attributed to 
management accountants: they do also have a service provider role and act as a consultant or 
navigator to management (e.g., Byrne and Pierce, 2007: 472; Maas and Matjka, 2009: 1235; 
Yazdifar and Tsamenyi, 2005: 181). Especially this role is continuously receiving more 
attention in recent years. A lot of evidence is supporting this development; examples among 
others are the longitudinal case study of Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) conducted with the 
UK-based manufacturing division of a multinational pharmaceuticals company or the study of 
Siegel and Sorensen (1999) in which they interviewed a large number of members of AICPA 
and IMA, professional associations of accountants and management accountants rooted in the 
US, by phone. This development implies that additional tasks are assigned to management 
accountants and they have to challenge managerial decisions, deeply analyze and scrutinize 
variances between actual and plan data, or discuss alternatives of business decisions. Thus, 
they do not solely provide information within their regular reporting routines; managers 
request management accountants to closely collaborate with them and to emphasize the 
business orientation to the activities of management accountants (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003: 
278-82). 
 Empirical literature confirms that tasks and roles of management accountants have been 
widened and advisory tasks are getting more important. Early studies did not cover those 
wider roles and tasks of management accountants or an involvement in managerial decision 
making processes (e.g., Hopper, 1980). Nevertheless, the drawback of inadequate business 
orientation and involvement was already addressed. The seminal study of Sathe (1982) 
revealed tendencies for extended tasks of management accountants in large US corporations. 
He argued that in most cases they belong to the management team and due to this reason they 
are at least at a minimum level involved in managerial decision making. 
 From a more European perspective, Granlund and Lukka (1998) analyzed the role of 
management accountants in a Finnish context. In their field study they found an expansion of 
the management accountants’ job descriptions with an increasing emphasis on advisory tasks, 
higher business orientation, and closer connections to the management team of the 
organizations. Their research revealed that management accountants do also act as change 
agents or consultants in their corporations. 
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 The findings of Byrne and Pierce (2007) indicated that business knowledge of 
management accountants positively impacts the interaction between management accountants 
and operational managers, enhances decision making processes, and affects the degree of 
influence of management accountants on business results. The authors derived those findings 
from interviews conducted with financial and operational managers in Irish manufacturing 
corporations.  
 Extended tasks of management accountants can lead to stronger interaction with other 
organizational functions or also to an involvement of management accountants in managerial 
decision making. The aspect of involvement in managerial decision making processes is 
analyzed by Zoni and Merchant (2007) for management accountants of large Italian 
corporations. They confirmed that management accountants are indeed to some degree 
involved in management and described factors influencing the extent as well as the breadth of 
involvement. In addition, they found a positive association between involvement of 
management accountants and performance. This supports the increasing advice to extend the 
involvement of management accountants in managerial processes. Furthermore, this 
involvement is also associated with business orientation of management accountants. In this 
context Emsley (2005) connected such focus with innovativeness of management accountants, 
i.e., measured as the number of applied management accounting innovations, as well as the 
efforts attributed to them. One of his findings was that management accountants with business 
orientation are associated with a greater level of innovativeness which is assessed as positive.  
 In addition to studies addressing broad managerial decision making processes, the study 
of Ferreira and Moulang (2009) focused on a specific aspect: the involvement of management 
accountants in strategic management processes. In their analysis in Australian companies they 
differentiated the stages of the strategic management processes in which the management 
accountants are involved. Strategic management processes embrace from their perspective 
strategic formulation and strategic implementation which in turn results in strategic 
effectiveness. They explored that an involvement of management accountants in strategic 
formulation is positively linked with an involvement of management accountants in strategic 
implementation. Furthermore, the authors showed a positive effect between the involvement 
in strategic formulation and strategic effectiveness which is fully mediated by the 
involvement in strategic implementation. 
 Moreover, Collier et al. (2004) added to this discussion as they analyzed the 
involvement of managers of different hierarchy levels in strategy processes. They addressed 
participants of postgraduate education courses at a business school in UK from 1993 to 1999. 
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Their results showed for their sample of managers as well as for sub-samples covering single 
corporate functions like finance and accounting that managerial involvement leads to the 
perception of enhanced and more effective strategy processes. 
 Although the extension of roles and tasks of management accountants is increasingly 
advocated in theory and business practice, potentially arising conflicts are not to be ignored. 
For instance, critics posit that an involvement of management accountants in managerial 
decision making processes might cause tension between the two responsibilities. If they are 
involved in decision making processes, the information they provide on corresponding results 
might be less objective (Indjejikian and Matjka, 2006; Sathe, 1982: 25; Siegel, 2000). 
Nevertheless, management accountants, albeit having extended tasks and roles, are still 
ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the traditional accounting and reporting 
information. Involvement in decision making or other activities beyond their core tasks 
therefore does not necessarily lead to a decrease in quality or integrity of distributed 
information (Maas and Hartmann, 2009: 2). 
 
2.2 Management accountants’ tasks and roles in incentive 
compensation
Previous research as well as the above mentioned aspects advocate that management 
accountants move away from their pure reporting tasks, are more involved in operational and 
strategic processes, and enhance their relevance within their organizations (e.g., Otley, 2001; 
Regel, 2003). This does also suggest that management accountants are capable to contribute 
to other selected organizational aspects related to their core activities. One of those aspects is 
incentive compensation. Incentive compensation belongs to the package of management 
controls of organizations. Packages of management control systems (MCS) which encompass 
several single controls and control mechanisms are in place to influence employees’ behavior. 
Thus, managers deploy those controls to induce decisions of subordinated employees 
consistent with objectives and strategies of their organization (e.g., Flamholtz et al., 1985: 35; 
Malmi and Brown, 2008: 290-1; Simons, 1995: 5).  
 MCS packages basically encompass five elements of controls: cultural controls, 
planning, cybernetic controls, rewards and compensation, and administrative controls (Malmi 
and Brown, 2008: 291-5). Rewards and compensation embrace incentive compensation 
schemes and are tightly linked with planning and cybernetic controls. Although rewards and 
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compensation do also encompass non-monetary rewards, performance-depended incentive 
compensation schemes are foremost of monetary nature.  
 Incentive compensation schemes play a focal role in organization’s design and 
effectiveness and are in place to align the interests of employees and owners (Baker et al., 
1988: 594-5; Lawler, 1995: 14). The application of incentive compensation can be explained 
with microeconomics and especially Principal-Agent Theory as they provide a framework to 
understand reasons and desired outcomes of incentives as well as executive compensation 
(Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999: 1999). It is argued that agents, e.g., subordinates in an 
organization, who have more private information than their superiors, the principals, may act 
in a dysfunctional manner and follow own objectives. Resulting problems may be reduced by 
implementing an incentive compensation scheme in order to achieve a commonality of 
interests between agent and principal. In particular, there are two desired effects to justify the 
application of incentive schemes: effort and selection effects (Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2007: 394-5; Prendergast, 1999; Waller and Chow, 1985: 458). Whereas the effort effect 
intends to ensure that employees’ efforts are channeled toward activities that facilitate the 
achievement of organizational goals the selection effects shall attract and retain ‘the right’ 
employees.  
 The effort effect addresses the primary objective of incentive compensation systems to 
motivate employees in order to take specific actions and better allocate efforts that will create 
organizational performance (Lazear, 1999: 202; Merchant et al., 2003: 252). Motivation in 
this case means that employees put extra efforts toward organizational objectives dependent 
on the opportunity to satisfy additional individual needs (Robbins, 1989: 147). Efforts 
directed to enhance performance can be described by effort direction, effort duration, and 
effort intensity (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002: 306). Effort direction refers to the employee’s 
choice of tasks, i.e., on which tasks the employee focuses on. Incentive compensation 
provides information what results are expected; against this background, the employees 
engage in those activities where their expected benefits outweigh or exceed their cost of doing 
the tasks. The effort duration aspect captures the time and length an employee works, i.e., 
how long they devote their individual resources to the assigned tasks or activities. Effort 
intensity refers to the amount of attention employees allocate to the respective tasks. It 
addresses what portion of the individual’s cognitive resources is directed toward the particular 
activity.  
 Notwithstanding possible caveats (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; Tosi et al., 2000), incentive 
compensation systems are a predominantly used control mechanism to induce behavior in 
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organizations. In this context, management accountants have an important role since they 
provide performance measures which are a focal element of those systems (Bushman and 
Smith, 2001: Section 2; Merchant et al., 2003: 252). The selection of adequate performance 
measures received widespread attention in theory and is at the same time a tremendous 
challenge in business practice (e.g., Gibbs et al., 2009: 237-8; Ittner and Larcker, 1998: 205). 
But, since none of the existing measures or combinations of measures offers a perfect 
solution, it is required to select a sufficient set-up depending on specific organizational 
characteristics like hierarchy or corporate functions. Reflecting this aspect and taking into 
account that an inadequate selection can induce dysfunctional managerial behavior as well as 
more appropriate performance measure properties can enhance desired effects, a thorough 
selection and evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of the implemented or suggested 
performance measures is of high importance (Bouwens and van Lent, 2006: 69; Kerr, 1975; 
Otley, 2001: 243-4).  
 Management accountants provide relevant information and advice in order to choose the 
appropriate performance measures. But, performance measures constitute only a fragment of 
incentive compensation systems. Results of performance measurement are linked with 
dedicated rewards taking a special incentive function into account. Furthermore, incentive 
compensation is only part of comprehensive remuneration packages which typically also 
comprise fixed and non-monetary components. Organizational tension might arise due to the 
fact that activities and responsibilities related to compensation systems belong to HR 
departments (e.g., Otley, 1999: 369; Stone, 2005: 441) and management accountants’ tasks 
are typically limited to the provision of required performance measures.  
 Taking the possible extended roles and tasks as well as the financial and business 
expertise of management accountants into account conceptual considerations suggest that 
management accountants could be more involved in incentive compensation activities. I.e., 
they should not only provide relevant information, management accountants could also be 
involved in broader aspects in this context. Thus, the involvement of management accountants 
in incentive compensation describes the degree to which management accountants participate 
in conceptual and operational activities in the context of incentive compensation (Bonner and 
Sprinkle, 2002: 338; Maas and Hartmann, 2009: 5-6; Sathe, 1982: 9). Against this 
background, respective activities include tasks to align incentive compensation systems with 
other controls, advisory tasks, or responsibilities to provide relevant information. For 
example, such tasks could encompass activities related to the definition of salary grading 
systems, the specification of the fragment of performance-dependent pay, or the enhancement 
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of promotion processes. Consequently, involvement should be beneficial since only aligned 
incentive systems including congruent performance measures activate desired managerial 
activities.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses development and research model  
In literature and business practice it is generally argued that management accountants’ 
extended tasks and roles are beneficial for organizations. Those benefits typically arise from 
an involvement of management accountants in extended responsibilities like managerial 
decision making (Zoni and Merchant, 2007) or strategic management (Ferreira and Moulang, 
2009). Based on those findings and thoughts, an involvement in incentive compensation 
should also be beneficial.  
 Incentives belong to MCS packages of organizations that are characterized by 
complexity and strong interaction among the different controls. To serve their purposes and 
especially to affect performance it is required that their design and operation is aligned with 
other controls and objectives of the organization (Lawler, 1995: 14; Rajagopalan and 
Finkelstein, 1992: 138-9). Foremost, management accountants’ expertise can contribute to 
better align incentive compensation with other controls to enhance the effort effects of the 
incentive compensation. For example, due to management accountants’ responsibilities in 
planning and budgeting they have sound proficiency about the organizations’ activities and 
past as well as expected development. With this expertise management accountants are, for 
instance, able to align, in cooperation with superior general managers and HR managers, 
targets and controls to avoid gaming. In this regard, it is not the question if the incentive 
compensation triggers any activities at all; more in focus is the argument that an involvement 
of management accountants increases the probability of aligned controls, which is in turn an 
important factor for effective incentive compensation.  
 Based on those arguments we propose a positive association between the involvement 
of management accountants in conceptual and operational activities related to incentive 
compensation and the desired effort effects of incentives. Thus, we derive our first hypothesis 
as follows: 
H1: The more management accountants are involved in incentive compensation, the 
stronger the effort effect of incentive compensation.  
 The involvement of management accountants in incentive compensation and the 
assumed enhanced alignment of controls may contribute to the effort effects of incentive 
compensation. Nevertheless, other factors might impact this effect as well. A prerequisite for 
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desired efforts are high quality employees. Empirical results confirm that total effects as well 
as effort effects of incentive compensation substantially depend on the ability to attract and 
retain adequate-skilled and -motivated managers (Bouwens and van Lent, 2006: 71). 
However, the presence of incentives has not only efforts effects; incentive compensation also 
serves as a selection device. Incentives help to support the self-selection of high quality 
managers into the organization as well as to retain them (Prendergast, 1999: 14). 
Compensation schemes with an essential performance-dependent element are likely to attract 
those employees whom believe to be comparatively more skilled and productive as well as 
who assume to be able to obtain additional income (Lawler, 1995: 15). This selection effect 
also encourages employees to retain or to leave the organization if the relation between the 
individuals’ expected cost and utility is not satisfactory. Reflecting those arguments we 
assume that an enhanced selection effect is positively linked with the effort effects of 
incentive compensation since adequate skills and potentials enable managers to act in a 
desired fashion. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 H2: The stronger the selection effect of incentive compensation, the stronger the 
effort effect of incentive compensation.  
 Several research activities addressed performance effects of comprehensive or strategic 
performance measurement systems (e.g., Burney and Widener, 2007; Ittner et al., 2003; Van 
der Stede et al., 2006). Foremost in scope of this research have been the diversity of 
performance measures as well as the alignment between the performance measurement 
systems and strategy. The results basically support the positive association of those two 
aspects and performance. This finding can also be transferred to our research setting since 
incentives are an integral part of performance measurement systems and involvement of 
management accountants in incentive compensation should also ensure the alignment between 
the incentive systems and others controls as well as with strategy. Thus, aligned incentive 
systems should also positively affect performance.  
 A similar conclusion can be made based on anecdotal evidence reported by Siegel and 
Sorensen (1999). The authors argue that management accountants possessing enlarged 
responsibilities and occupying wider roles do contribute stronger to the organization and 
support the enhancement of better decision making processes (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999: 6). 
Transferred to our research setting, we can assume that management accountants involved in 
incentive compensation can also positively influence managerial decision making and may 
contribute to the performance of their organization.  
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 With regard to incentive compensation, Banker et al. (2001: 347) confirmed in their 
study that incentives help to attract and retain in particular productive employees as well as 
motivate them to channel their efforts to organizational objectives. But, this does not imply 
that controls themselves improve performance, interpreted as market performance, directly. 
Controls and in particular incentive compensation are in place to influence managerial 
behavior, i.e., the efforts of managers, which is intended to result in higher levels of 
performance (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002: 310). Nevertheless, performance has a complex and 
multilayer character (Lenz, 1981) and its concept is strongly associated with confounding 
factors and time lags within its dimensions. Against this background and to cope for potential 
difficulties in the analysis, we transfer the idea that incentives indirectly improve performance 
to our research setting. Thus, we do not propose a direct link between the effects of incentive 
compensation and a single measure of performance. Instead, we suggest an initially positive 
effect of incentive compensation on managerial decision making. Beyond this link, we 
propose that those enhanced decision making processes should in turn increase internal 
efficiency and subsequently firm performance from a market perspective. In the following, we 
derive three specific hypotheses capturing the links between effort effects of incentive 
compensation, managerial decision making, internal efficiency, and market performance. 
 The first of those three hypotheses addresses the link between incentives and managerial 
decision making. Incentives are foremost in place to influence managerial behavior. 
Managerial behavior or actions embrace decisions as core tasks. Taking into account that 
incentives and in particular the demanded effort effects should create shared understandings 
within the corporation and trigger managerial decisions in line with the company’s targets, 
incentives should consequently also enhance the decision making processes.  
 Furthermore, incentives should also support decision making processes by reducing 
friction in corresponding procedures and information exchange (Kelly, 2010: 45-48). 
Incentives might create a basis for cooperation between involved team members which is a 
requirement for effective strategic decisions (Amason, 1996: 125). Based on these 
considerations and keeping in mind that the ultimate goal of control systems is “to improve 
managerial decision making” (Lipe and Salterio, 2002: 531) we specify the third hypothesis:  
 H3: The stronger the effort effect of incentive compensation, the better the decision 
making processes.  
 Organizational theory in principle suggests that the performance of an organization 
depends on actions of individuals (e.g., Burney and Widener (2007): 44). For managers, such 
actions typically are decisions. Consequently, high quality decisions should lead to enhanced 
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performance. The quality of decisions depends on the quality of decision making process 
(Steiner, 1972: 35). Thus, good decision making process enable enhanced decisions that  
should be followed by enhanced performance (e.g., Amason, 1996). More specifically, the 
argumentation considers that increased quality of decisions initially leads to enhanced 
implementation processes which are reflected in situations distinguished by, for instance, 
better allocated resources and improved internal processes. We state the fourth hypothesis as 
follows:  
 H4: The better the decision making processes, the better the internal efficiency.  
 Finally, performance from a market perspective should be a consequence arising from 
those prior arguments. If efficient usage of resources leads to realized cost reduction 
potentials, it should be assumed that this therewith also leads to profitability and growth in 
consequence. Thus, we postulate the fifth hypothesis as follows:  
 H5: The better the internal efficiency, the better the market performance.  
 Furthermore, the argumentation of hypotheses 3 to 5 is basically also in line with the 
reasoning in Callen et al. (2008). The authors explicitly addressed the linkage of incentives, 
actions (i.e., in their terminology breadth and intensity of just-in-time (JIT) practices), and 
performance. They report that incentives have an impact on the decision to adopt JIT 
practices, i.e., incentives influence managerial actions. Furthermore, they reveal an 
association between actions and performance. But, although they posited a direct link between 
incentives and performance, they could not confirm this association.  
 In summary, extended roles and tasks of management accountants are deemed to be 
beneficial for organizations. We consider that this does also apply for conceptual and 
operational responsibilities related to incentive compensation. Such involvement of 
management accountants should enhance the alignment of control mechanisms and foremost 
positively influence the effort effects of incentive compensation. We do also argue, in line 
with economic theory, that incentives serve a selection function and that selection effects also 
have a positive effect on effort effects. At last, we expect that effort effects of incentive 
compensation enhance performance; we postulate links between effort effects, decision 
making processes, internal efficiency, and market performance. This theoretical 
argumentation as well as the hypotheses can be summarized in the research model depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Research model  
 
 Our previous reasoning dealt with the increasing breadth of management accountants’ 
tasks and roles. In spite of this thought management accountants typically are exposed to role 
conflicts and one of their roles dominates their activities (Maas and Matjka, 2009: 1234-6). 
Following the ideas of Mouritsen (1996: 297) we accordingly propose that the role with the 
highest priority for the management accountant has an impact on the involvement in incentive 
compensation. E.g., management accountants placing a higher weight on advisory tasks will 
supposedly be more involved in incentive compensation compared to management 
accountants emphasizing information providing tasks. To obtain more insights in the meaning 
of role types or possible dominant role types we propose sub-group analyses. Thus, we can 
possibly validate the robustness of our research model and reinforce the hypothesis tests.  
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3 Research method 
After presenting related literature and our hypotheses, Section 3 embraces details on the 
research method of our project and is split into four parts. The data collection procedures are 
described in the first part of this section. In the second part we present the results of the data 
collection procedures and describe our sample. The third part provides details on the 
constructs we employed in our study. The fourth part covers explanations on the statistical 
techniques we used for data analysis.  
 
3.1 Survey design and administration 
Data for this study were gathered by means of a questionnaire-based survey in the period of 
March to May 2009. Starting point of our data collection was a database that included contact 
details of German firms covering all industries. We excluded financial institutions due to their 
specific business models and regulatory requirements, ranked the list of companies with 
regard to revenue, and selected the top 1,500 companies as our baseline. Furthermore, we 
discarded another 281 companies for various reasons (e.g., lack of dedicated management 
accounting department, double counts due to legal form constructions, or ceased operations). 
Thus, 1,219 companies remained as our target population. 
 In most cases, data gathering procedures in survey research apply single informant-
designs, i.e., one respondent per company answers relevant questions and assesses constructs. 
Quality of obtained data accordingly depends on the adequate selection of respondents. 
Especially two potential problems are associated with such single informant-designs: key 
informant and common method biases. Information provided by survey participants, i.e., key 
informants, is normally not limited to personal opinions since their ratings typically also 
embrace departmental or company-related aspects. Potential key informant biases might arise, 
if the respondents do not possess adequate knowledge due to their functional or hierarchical 
position in the company (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988: 423-5). Furthermore, selection of respondents 
and the research design might create a common method bias. Such effect potentially results 
from research designs in which independent and dependent variables are assessed by the same 
person. Possible explanations are for instance consistency motifs, implicit theories, social 
desirability, or affectivity of respondents (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003: 
881-3). 
 To cope with those two potential biases we carefully selected the respondents and 
implemented a multi informant-design. Taking required competencies with regard to 
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functional and hierarchical position into account we decided to approach the heads of 
management accounting departments to evaluate questions related to role models and the 
construct of involvement of management accountants in incentive compensation. And, we 
surveyed the constructs related to the effects of incentive compensation and performance with 
general managers of the companies, as we consider them as the most adequate respondents for 
those aspects. The result of this choice of respondents was the multi informant-design of our 
study. Hence, we were able to use dyadic data sets to analyze the research model. As 
consequence, this should also reduce the risk of a potential common method bias. In addition, 
we also conducted the single-factor-test of Harman (1967) to check for a possible signal of 
such a bias. Results of the exploratory factor analysis did not reveal a single or common factor 
indicating no risk of a common method bias. For additional validation purposes, we discussed 
and confirmed our selection of key informants during the pre-test procedures and did also 
send abbreviated questionnaires to HR managers on a later stage of our project for validation 
purposes. Summarizing our activities in this context, our research approach should alleviate 
possible key informant or common method biases. 
 For data collection we applied a three-step implementation strategy. First, we contacted 
each firm by phone to check data accuracy, asked for the latest contact details, and introduced 
the study. Second, we sent a cover letter and the questionnaires by e-mail to the heads of the 
management accounting departments. (In a few cases, participants requested for sending the 
instruments by fax or mail). We asked for two things: (i) to fill out the functionally 
customized questionnaires for management accountants and (ii) to forward a survey package 
to a general manager (i.e., a member of the upper or upper middle management like the CEO, 
managing director, or division manager). Third, we sent out two reminder e-mails, two 
respectively four weeks after the initial mailing. To enhance the chance of participation we 
personalized all correspondence and offered a research report covering the main findings of 
our study to all participants. 
 
3.2 Sample description 
A total of 280 persons (management accountants: 165; general managers: 115) participated in 
our study and sent back the questionnaires. Six questionnaires (management accountants: 4; 
general managers: 2) had to be discarded due to a large number of missing data. Due to the 
intended dyadic research design we need matched pairs of the questionnaires. Reflecting this 
aspect, we could rely on answers of 113 dyadic sets of completed questionnaires giving a 
return rate of 9.27%. The response rate of our study is lower than anticipated and below 
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average in typical empirical management accounting studies (Van der Stede et al., 2005: 671-
2). Possible reasons for this low response rate and messages from non-participating firms 
embrace other priorities of executives during the ongoing economical downturn in spring 
2009, the growing number of firms with a policy of not participating in survey research due to 
the increasing number of requests, and the special complexity of our research project to obtain 
dyadic data. The low response rate raises a potential limitation of our study. But for all that 
the sample is large enough to process planned statistical techniques for analyzing the 
hypotheses. 
 Non-response bias is one inherent limitation of survey research. The potential especially 
arises in studies with low response rates. To test for any bias we split the data set into two 
groups according to the number of days from initial mailing until receipt of the returned 
instrument and searched for possible divergent answers. The underlying rationale is that 
respondents who participate later are expected to answer more similar to non-respondents 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977: 397). In order to assess the answers we employed Mann-
Whitney U-tests for every item of the questionnaire. We only found little significant 
differences (p < 0.05) between early and late respondents for two items (P_DP_1 and 
P_IE_3). However, we are confident that this relatively low number does not cause serious 
problems for the interpretation of our results.  
 Tables 1 and 2 provide information regarding the organizations’ size in terms of 
revenue and number of employees. Taking into account that departments of management 
accountants and incentive compensation as formal controls are primarily in place in 
medium/large-sized companies, descriptive statistics indicate that the firms were large enough 
to ensure that relevant constructs apply.  
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Revenue (Million EUR) Frequency Percentage 
0 – 500 32 28.57% 
501 – 1,000 39 34.82% 
1,001 – 5,000 27 24.11% 
5,001 – 10,000 4 3.57% 
10,001 – 20,000 3 2.68% 
> 20,000 7 6.25% 
   
Mean 3,657 
Standard deviation 8,357 
Lower quartile 500 
Median 800 
Upper quartile 2,209 
   
N * 112 
Notes: 
* Not all companies did provide details on revenue 
 
Table 1: Surveyed firms by revenue 
 
Employees Frequency Percentage 
0 – 500 6 5.31% 
501 – 1,000 14 12.39% 
1,001 – 5,000 55 48.67% 
5,001 – 10,000 13 11.50% 
10,001 – 20,000 13 11.50% 
> 20,000 12 10.62% 
   
Mean 12,777 
Standard deviation 45,358 
Lower quartile 1,400 
Median 3,300 
Upper quartile 7,500 
   
N  113 
  
Table 2: Surveyed firms by number of employees 
 
 We only excluded financial institutions in our research project. Hence, our sample is 
cross-sectional and the predominant industries are wholesale/retail, chemicals/health care, and 
utilities. Table 3 offers more details on industry composition of our sample.  
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Industry Frequency Percentage 
Wholesale and retail 15 13.27% 
Chemicals and health care 13 11.50% 
Utilities 13 11.50% 
Automotive 11 9.73% 
Industrial goods 10 8.85% 
Consumer goods 8 7.08% 
Manufacturing 7 6.19% 
Information technology 6 5.31% 
Construction 5 4.42% 
Transport and logistics 4 3.54% 
Media and communication 4 3.54% 
Real estate 4 3.54% 
Services 3 2.65% 
Telecommunication 2 1.77% 
Tourism 2 1.77% 
Others 6 5.31% 
   
N  113 
  
Table 3: Distribution of respondents by industry 
 
3.3 Description and measurement of constructs 
The research model in Figure 1 contains one construct to measure the involvement of 
management accountants in incentive compensation (IMA), two constructs focusing on the 
effects of incentive compensation (ICE_E and ICE_S), and three constructs addressing the 
dimensions of performance (P_DP, P_IE, and P_MP). Those theoretical constructs of our 
model are measured as latent variables which comprise multiple indicators, e.g., survey items, 
for an indirect measurement. If possible, we drew upon existing instruments which have been 
used for empirical research in the past and have shown sufficient reliability and validity. In 
another case, we adjusted an existing scale in a way that it better fits to our research design, or 
we employed newly generated scales drawn from the relevant literature. We applied a six-
point rating scale with “do not agree at all” and “totally agree” as anchors for all measures 
(deviations are indicated below). 
 Survey instruments were pilot-tested by five executives from business practice and six 
academic researchers to ensure reliable and valid measurements in our study. Some of the 
survey items have been slightly adjusted afterwards. As this research project was conducted in 
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Germany, we applied German language for the questionnaires. Thus, if existing scales were in 
English, we searched for German translations in the literature or translated them carefully. 
 Operationalization of constructs is either possible by reflective or by formative 
measurement (Bisbe et al., 2007: 799ff.; Bollen and Lennox, 1991: 305-6; Edwards and 
Bagozzi, 2000). For reflective measurement models, indicators of the construct, i.e., single 
items or questions in the questionnaire, are reflections of the construct. Indicators are 
interpreted as interchangeable and changes in the construct ‘cause’ changes of the indicators. 
Following a formative measurement, the indicators affect and constitute the construct. 
Consequently, changes of the indicators lead to or ‘cause’ changes of the latent variable. 
Reflecting the suggestions of Jarvis et al. (2003: 202f.), we only apply reflective measures in 
this paper. 
 After discussing those basic principles, we proceed with explanations and the 
operationalization of our variables. Full details of the instruments are provided in the 
Appendix.  
The first variable of the research model is “Involvement of management accountants 
(IMA)”. In our research context it addresses the tasks of management accountants related to 
incentive compensation with regard to conceptual and operational aspects. As there is no scale 
for this construct available in literature, we applied a self-developed instrument. Basically, we 
followed the thoughts of Zoni and Merchant (2007) who use a scale to measure the 
involvement of management accountants in managerial decision making on the basis of the 
work from Sathe (1982). We amended and narrowed the ideas for our purposes and derived a 
seven item instrument. Aspects deemed to be part of the construct are, for instance, the 
mentioned involvement of management accountants in conceptual issues (IMA_1), aligned 
control and compensation systems as well as consistently applied performance measures 
(IMA_2 and IMA_3), management accountants’ duties as information provider (IMA_5), and 
collaboration and information exchange between involved parties (IMA_4, IMA_6, and 
IMA_7). Although Zoni and Merchant (2007) split their variable into two areas, i.e., operating 
and strategic decisions, they treated the variable as uni-dimensional. We do also assume that 
the construct is uni-dimensional and processed an exploratory factor analysis for verification. 
Results of these procedures confirmed our assumption of the uni-dimensional measurement. 
The instruments to measure the effects of incentive compensation were also partly 
developed for this study. As the conceptualization follows two dimensions, the construct will 
be operationalized accordingly.  
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First, the variable “Effort effects (ICE_E)” describes the extent to which incentives 
influence efforts of managerial actions. As conceptualized, efforts embrace aspects of effort 
direction, duration, and intensity (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002: 306-7). Our carefully self-
developed scale comprises seven items. More specifically, the instrument covers facets of 
intentions and directions during decision making processes (ICE_E_1 and ICE_E_2), 
sustained and goal orientated behavior (ICE_E_3, ICE_E_4, and ICE_E_5), and the overall 
attention managers devote to activities and the possible connected impact on their incentive 
compensation (ICE_E_6 and ICE_E_7).  
Second, the “Selection effects (ICE_S)” variable is also related to incentive 
compensation effects. It addresses the impact of incentive compensation on attracting and 
retaining employees and managers. We apply and enhance a three item instrument from 
Bouwens and van Lent (2006: 63) for our study. We added two items in order to achieve a 
more comprehensive measure. In addition to the items from Bouwens and van Lent (2006), 
which, for instance, embrace market attractiveness of the company (ICE_S_1) or ‘fit’ of 
recruited managers (ICE_S_4), we included one item related to market orientation of the 
compensation (ICE_S_2) and one associated to the retention goal of incentives (ICE_S_5).  
A fundamental challenge for researchers in management accounting or other business 
disciplines is the selection of constructs to measure success or performance of companies 
(Van der Stede et al., 2005: 675; March and Sutton, 1997; Wall et al., 2004). One of the 
pivotal points in this discussion is whether the mode of assessment should be objective or 
rather subjective. In our study, we follow a subjective or perceptual approach. One underlying 
reason is for instance that a major part of our population consists of companies that do not 
have to and typically do not disclose their financial reports or financial information. 
Furthermore, as performance is always of context-specific nature, there is actually no single 
performance measure that is appropriate to measure performance in all different industries or 
companies (Malagueño, 2009: 7).  
Reflecting the complex and multilayer character of performance (e.g., Lenz, 1981) we 
follow our conceptualization as well as our hypotheses and distinguish three levels of 
performance and specify three constructs. These constructs cover facets of the quality of 
decision making processes, organizational or internal effectiveness, and aspects of market 
performance (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986: 803-4). The three dimensions of 
performance also reflect the consecutive character of the three constructs: decision making 
processes enhance internal efficiency that in turn shall result in market performance (e.g., 
Degraeve and Roodhooft, 1999; Vandenbosch, 1999: 81). 
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The variable “Decision making processes (P_DP)” covers aspects of managerial 
decision making and the company’s management cycle (Weber and Schäffer, 2008: 62-4). It 
comprises the phases planning (P_DP_1, P_DP_2, and P_DP_3), implementation (P_DP_4), 
and finally monitoring of decisions (P_DP_5). The variable reflects the immediate outcome of 
control processes. It is measured by means of a (in German management accounting research) 
well established instrument adopted from Spillecke (2006: 165) and comprises five indicators.  
“Internal efficiency (P_IE)” is measured with a four item scale from Homburg et al. 
(2008), which was adopted by Mahmood and Soon (1991). The items, which measure the 
construct relative to the competitors of the company in the last three years, cover aspects of 
cost efficiency (P_IE_1 and P_IE_3), resource allocation (P_IE_2), and internal processes 
(P_IE_4). We applied for this and the following variable reflecting market performance a 
different rating scale with “much worse” and “much better” as anchors. 
To measure “Market performance (P_MP)” we adhere to the underlying work of 
Buzzell and Gale (1987) and employ the instrument from Deshpandé and Farley. They 
measure market performance in comparison to the performance of the firm’s competitors’ 
performance with a four item instrument. The items embrace profitability, market share, 
growth rate, and size.  
In order to further validate our model and to gain more insights into the roles of 
management accountants in incentive compensation we include specific role models in our 
analysis. To obtain data we basically followed the ideas of Newman et al. (1989: 131) and 
asked management accountants to distribute their workload (percentage) among three roles. 
Apart from the role as advisor to management we split the role as information provider due to 
the reason that there are two addressees of management accounting information, i.e., 
management itself and financial reporting. We denoted those two roles as “Provider of 
advanced management accounting information” and as “Provider of information for financial 
reporting purposes” (Angelkort et al., 2008: 16). Against the background that literature and 
our presumptions suggest that the role model with the highest priority for the respective 
management accountants might have an impact on the results of our research model we try to 
derive in addition a dominant role type for every respondent (Henri, 2006: 80). This role type 
is obtained by selecting the role type with the highest allocated workload. We are aware that 
those roles and especially the derived dominant role types are just ideals since management 
accountants in the most cases fulfill – at least partially – all roles and do not only adopt one of 
them. Furthermore, it is not always possible to clearly cluster their activities in those three 
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roles. Although this marks a limitation we are confident that the data is suitable at least for 
validation purposes.  
 
3.4 Techniques for data analysis 
To test the hypotheses of our research model we adopt the partial least squares (PLS) 
approach, which is a variance-based structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. 
Specifically, we employ the software SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). This approach allows 
the examination of constructs (measurement model) and theories (structural model): The 
measurement model estimates the relations between the indicators and the constructs that they 
represent; the structural model specifies, in turn, relations among the constructs (Anderson 
and Gerbing, 1988). Analysis and interpretation follow a two-stage approach: first, 
assessment of reliability and validity of measurement models; second, assessment of 
structural model (Hulland, 1999: 198). 
In general, SEM approaches can cope with limitations of more traditional statistical 
techniques and constitute the motivation to call for more research in management accounting 
using SEM (e.g., Chenhall, 2003: 155; Shields and Shields, 1998: 67; Smith and Langfield-
Smith, 2004: 49). To accentuate this need, the number of studies using SEM in management 
accounting research is relatively small compared to other fields of business research such as 
marketing or organizational science (Smith and Langfield-Smith, 2004: 61). Smith and 
Langfield-Smith (2004), for instance, find in their review (research period: 1980 to 2001) 
across ten leading (management) accounting journals that only 20 published management 
accounting papers used SEM.  
SEM analyses are either possible applying the predominant covariance-based or less 
employed variance-based techniques (Fornell and Cha, 1994: 52; Chin, 1998: 295; Chin and 
Newsted, 1999: 307-8 and 314). However, variance-based PLS approaches offer dedicated 
advantages over covariance-based techniques like LISREL or AMOS. Particularly, PLS 
allows (i) the application in more exploratory research contexts with scarce theoretical and 
empirical knowledge, (ii) the analysis of smaller data sets due to less restrictive sample size 
requirements, (iii) higher complexity in research models, (iv) the neglect of the multivariate 
normality distribution requirement of underlying data, and (v) the less limited application of 
reflective and formative measurement models (Chin, 1998; Chin and Newsted, 1999; 
Henseler et al., 2009: 282-3; Wold, 1980: 51). Reflecting the arguments mentioned above – 
especially the first and the second aspect – we found PLS more appropriate for our purposes. 
In addition it should be mentioned that there is a growing number of studies using the PLS 
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approach in recent literature indicating appropriateness in principle (e.g., Chapman and Kihn, 
2009; Homburg and Stebel, 2009; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007).  
In order to validate our model we process sub-group analyses based on the dominant 
role types of management accountants. We follow the procedures of conducting PLS-based 
group comparisons suggested by Henseler et al. (2009: 309). The approach assesses the 
observed distribution of the outcome of the bootstrapping procedures. The following equation 
allows testing hypotheses to verify the probability of differences in parameters between two 
sub-groups:  
 Pb(1)>b(2)(1)(2)=1-(2b
1	bj1-2b2+bi2)
J2
j,i
  
In this equation, b denotes the parameter estimates, i.e., the path coefficients,  the true 
population parameters,  the unit step function, and J the number of bootstrap samples. 
Superscripts in parentheses mark the respective sub-group; overlines indicate mean values.  
 
4 Results 
We present our results in the following section which comprises three parts. The first part 
provides descriptive statistics on the involvement of management accountants in incentive 
compensation and role types of management accountants. The second part addresses the 
results of the measurement models and the third part the results of the structural models of our 
research project. In this section we distinguish between a main research model and alternative 
models. The distinctive feature is the data set: whereas the main research model is based on 
our full dyadic data set, the alternative models are only based on fragments according to the 
dominant role types of management accountants. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Our first research question addresses the involvement of management accountants in incentive 
compensation. To answer this research question we rely on the data embracing the answers of 
management accountants. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the seven items of the IMA 
variable indicating that management accountants participate in design and operation of 
incentive compensation systems. Overall, data show that involvement is relatively high. 
Especially items IMA_2, IMA_5, and IMA_6 reveal high mean values. The two latter ones 
represent tasks related to the core responsibilities of management accountants as provider of 
required information. IMA_5 addresses the aspect that management accountants provide 
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relevant information needed for incentive compensation systems. IMA_6 asks, if management 
accountants are approached for advice in case of queries related to performance measures and 
corresponding influencing factors. In turn, IMA_2 indicates one positive outcome, i.e., 
aligned systems, of the involvement. Cooperation between management accountants and HR 
managers (IMA_7) discloses the lowest mean score. 
 
Item Mean Std. dev. 
Relative frequency distribution (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
IMA_1 3.876 1.675 12.39% 16.81% 6.19% 15.04% 34.51% 15.04% 
IMA_2 5.150 0.918 0.00% 1.77% 6.19% 6.19% 46.90% 38.94% 
IMA_3 4.088 1.485 5.31% 15.04% 12.39% 15.93% 35.40% 15.93% 
IMA_4 3.965 1.581 9.73% 13.27% 9.73% 23.01% 26.55% 17.70% 
IMA_5 5.186 1.023 0.88% 3.54% 0.88% 11.50% 37.17% 46.02% 
IMA_6 5.009 1.122 1.77% 5.31% 1.77% 7.08% 49.56% 34.51% 
IMA_7 3.726 1.611 13.27% 15.04% 10.62% 18.58% 31.86% 10.62% 
Notes: 
N = 113 
6-point rating scale, anchors: 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of involvement of management accountants  
 
As pointed out, tasks of management accountants are typically linked with three roles. 
Results of respondents’ answers are presented in Table 5 and provide evidence that all three 
roles are existent. Reflecting the mean scores, the respondents spent the largest fraction of 
their working time with advisory tasks to management (42.34%). The roles as information 
provider to management (35.07%) and for financial reporting purposes (22.59%) are of lower 
importance. Despite the fact that our research setting and the results do not reveal any 
intertemporal effects we conclude that those results are consistent with recent literature. The 
results suggest a focus of management accountants on advisory tasks which can be assumed 
to be strongly connected to a higher business orientation of management accountants which is 
requested from general managers. 
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Role of management accountant Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Advisor to management  42.34% 20.460 0.00% 80.00% 
Provider of advanced management accounting information 35.07% 17.417 10.00% 80.00% 
Provider of information for financial reporting purposes 22.59% 15.023 0.00% 70.00% 
Notes: 
N = 113 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of management accountants’ roles 
 
Dominant role types are derived to validate our results. We could allocate 96 
management accountants to a certain dominant type. The answers of 17 respondents have 
been excluded since a distinct allocation to one of the roles was not possible. Data in Table 6 
indicate that most management accountants (49) basically understand themselves as an 
advisor to management. This is consistent with the results previously described that 
management accountants spend – on average – 42.34% of their working time on consulting 
activities. 34 of the respondents allocated most of their working time to their role as provider 
of advanced management accounting information. Finally, 13 of the respondents could be 
allocated to the third dominant type, management accountants as a provider of information for 
financial reporting purposes. 
To immerse our analysis regarding the degree of involvement of management 
accountants in incentive compensation, we analyze the results reflecting the dominant role 
types. First, we derive a mean score based on the seven items for every respondent. Second, 
we group those scores by the dominant role types and derive a mean for the three dominant 
roles. Results indicate that management accountants which deem themselves more as an 
advisor to management tend to be stronger involved in incentive compensation than the other 
two groups. Corresponding results are presented in Table 6.  
 
Role of management accountant N 
Involvement of MAs 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Dominant role type      
Advisor to management  49 4.685 0.948 2.143 6.000 
Provider of advanced management accounting information 34 4.126 1.264 1.714 6.000 
Provider of information for financial reporting purposes 13 4.198 1.121 2.000 5.857 
Notes: 
N = 113 
MA - Management accountant 
 
Table 6: Involvement of management accountants according to dominant role types 
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4.2 Results of measurement models 
The next two sections are devoted to provide answers to the second research question whether 
an involvement of management accountants has a positive impact of the effects of incentive 
compensation and subsequently performance. We employ our dyadic data covering both 
responses from management accountants and general managers to answer this research 
question. In this section, the measurement models of the research model are evaluated. The 
results of the structural model and especially the tests of the hypotheses are presented in the 
subsequent section.  
Sufficient reliability and validity of the measurement models are a prerequisite to 
analyze structural models. For assessing the measures of our study we employ a two step 
approach. First, we examine item reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of 
the constructs of our main research model (Hulland, 1999: 198-201; Henseler et al., 2009: 
298-300). We discuss applied procedures below and present corresponding full details in 
Tables 7-9). Second, we further validate the constructs related to the involvement of 
management accountants in incentive compensation and related to incentive compensation 
effects as well as reveal the results of our construct analysis with data for the alternative 
models.  
Item or indicator reliability is analyzed based on the respective factor loadings of the 
constructs. Factor loadings should exceed 0.7; i.e., more than 50% of an indicator’s variance 
should be explained by its underlying construct. Furthermore, indicators with factor loadings 
below 0.4 should be removed from the measurement models (Hulland, 1999: 198; Bagozzi 
and Baumgartner, 1994: 402). As shown in Tables 7-9, only three items of our study load 
marginally below 0.7 (i.e., ICE_E_1: 0.678, ICE_S_4: 0.691, and P_IE_4: 0.664) which 
deemed acceptable since they partly belong to newly developed scales and other loadings are 
well above the threshold.  
Convergent validity (also referred to as composite reliability) evaluates the 
comprehensive constructs which is even more important than the analysis of individual 
indicators (Bagozzi and Baumgartner, 1994: 402). Convergent validity is indicated when each 
item strongly correlates with its own construct and can be assessed with Cronbach’s alpha 
(CA), the composite reliability (CR) measure, and average variance extracted (AVE) 
statistics. Proposed minimum requirements are 0.7 for CA, 0.6 for CR, and 0.5 for AVE 
(Bagozzi and Yi, 1988: 80; Fornell and Larcker, 1981: 45-6; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994: 
264-5). We conclude to possess an acceptable level of convergent validity since all constructs 
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meet the three mentioned criteria (CA = 0.928-0.776 > 0.7; CR = 0.928-0.856 > 0.6; 
AVE = 0.671-0.545 > 0.5) as displayed in Tables 7-9.  
 
Item  Mean Std. dev. 
Factor 
loading
Relative frequency distribution (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
IMA_1  3.876 1.675 0.744 12.39% 16.81% 6.19% 15.04% 34.51% 15.04%
IMA_2  5.150 0.918 0.818 0.00% 1.77% 6.19% 6.19% 46.90% 38.94%
IMA_3  4.088 1.485 0.834 5.31% 15.04% 12.39% 15.93% 35.40% 15.93%
IMA_4  3.965 1.581 0.821 9.73% 13.27% 9.73% 23.01% 26.55% 17.70%
IMA_5  5.186 1.023 0.784 0.88% 3.54% 0.88% 11.50% 37.17% 46.02%
IMA_6  5.009 1.122 0.808 1.77% 5.31% 1.77% 7.08% 49.56% 34.51%
IMA_7  3.726 1.611 0.823 13.27% 15.04% 10.62% 18.58% 31.86% 10.62%
           
CA 0.911          
CR 0.928          
AVE 0.648          
Notes: 
N = 113 
6-point rating scale, anchors: 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
CA - Cronbach’s alpha; CR - composite reliability; AVE - average variance extracted 
 
Table 7: Variable assessment – “Involvement of management accountants (IMA)” 
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Item  Mean Std. dev. 
Factor 
loading
Relative frequency distribution (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ICE_E - Incentive compensation effects_Effort effect 
ICE_E_1  2.982 1.172 0.678 7.96% 32.74% 23.89% 24.78% 9.73% 0.88% 
ICE_E_2  3.823 1.189 0.794 5.31% 9.73% 15.93% 38.94% 26.55% 3.54% 
ICE_E_3  4.230 1.052 0.722 1.77% 5.31% 11.50% 38.94% 34.51% 7.96% 
ICE_E_4  3.779 1.178 0.700 3.54% 15.04% 15.04% 33.63% 31.86% 0.88% 
ICE_E_5  4.248 1.090 0.846 2.65% 5.31% 9.73% 37.17% 37.17% 7.96% 
ICE_E_6  4.221 1.171 0.816 3.54% 4.42% 15.93% 27.43% 39.82% 8.85% 
ICE_E_7  4.248 1.169 0.872 2.65% 7.08% 11.50% 30.09% 38.94% 9.73% 
           
CA 0.890          
CR 0.914          
AVE 0.606          
           
ICE_S - Incentive compensation effects_Selection effect 
ICE_S_1  4.814 0.840 0.785 0.00% 0.88% 7.08% 19.47% 54.87% 17.70%
ICE_S_2  4.690 0.780 0.713 0.00% 0.88% 4.42% 31.86% 50.44% 12.39%
ICE_S_3  4.142 1.141 0.754 0.88% 11.50% 11.50% 31.86% 37.17% 7.08% 
ICE_S_4  4.549 0.866 0.691 0.00% 0.88% 11.50% 30.09% 46.90% 10.62%
ICE_S_5  4.690 0.856 0.745 0.00% 2.65% 6.19% 22.12% 57.52% 11.50%
           
CA 0.794          
CR 0.857          
AVE 0.545          
Notes: 
N = 113 
6-point rating scale, anchors: 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
CA - Cronbach’s alpha; CR - composite reliability; AVE - average variance extracted 
 
Table 8: Variable assessment – “Incentive compensation effects (ICE)” 
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Item  Mean Std. dev. 
Factor 
loading
Relative frequency distribution (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
P_DP - Performance_Decision making processes 
P_DP_1  4.133 0.921 0.782 0.00% 6.19% 15.04% 40.71% 35.40% 2.65% 
P_DP_2  4.009 0.931 0.847 0.00% 7.96% 17.70% 40.71% 32.74% 0.88% 
P_DP_3  4.248 0.882 0.874 0.88% 1.77% 15.04% 39.82% 38.94% 3.54% 
P_DP_4  4.080 0.825 0.791 0.00% 3.54% 17.70% 47.79% 29.20% 1.77% 
P_DP_5  4.000 0.896 0.796 0.88% 2.65% 25.66% 38.05% 31.86% 0.88% 
           
CA 0.877          
CR 0.910          
AVE 0.671          
           
P_IE - Performance_Internal efficiency 
P_IE_1  4.381 0.900 0.813 0.88% 0.88% 11.50% 41.59% 36.28% 8.85% 
P_IE_2  4.345 0.961 0.837 0.00% 3.54% 16.81% 28.32% 44.25% 7.08% 
P_IE_3  4.487 0.946 0.775 0.00% 0.88% 14.16% 35.40% 34.51% 15.04%
P_IE_4  4.212 0.901 0.664 0.00% 3.54% 15.04% 44.25% 30.97% 6.19% 
           
CA 0.776          
CR 0.856          
AVE 0.600          
           
P_MP - Performance_Market performance 
P_MP_1  4.345 1.075 0.836 0.00% 5.31% 15.93% 31.86% 32.74% 14.16%
P_MP_2  4.150 1.167 0.816 0.88% 8.85% 15.93% 36.28% 24.78% 13.27%
P_MP_3  4.195 1.117 0.765 1.77% 4.42% 19.47% 31.86% 31.86% 10.62%
P_MP_4  4.177 1.204 0.750 1.77% 8.85% 12.39% 38.94% 23.01% 15.04%
           
CA 0.811          
CR 0.872          
AVE 0.630          
Notes: 
N = 113 
6-point rating scale, anchors (P_DP): 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
6-point rating scale, anchors (P_IE; P_MP): 1 - much worse ; 6 - much better (compared with 
competitor) 
CA - Cronbach’s alpha; CR - composite reliability; AVE - average variance extracted 
 
Table 9: Variable assessment – “Performance (P)” 
 
Discriminant validity exhibits that the operationalization of two constructs diverges 
from each other. It implies that indicators underlying one construct correlate weakly with the 
indicators of other constructs; i.e., it describes the extent to which the measures differ from 
each other. To assess this aspect we employ the Fornell/Larcker-Criterion which checks 
whether the square roots of AVE of each construct exceed the correlations between the two 
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constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981: 46). Table 10 shows the correlation matrix and the 
square roots of AVE statistics and reveals that all construct pairs fulfill this criterion.  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 IMA 0.805      
2 ICE_E 0.302 0.779     
3 ICE_S 0.172 0.570 0.738    
4 P_DP 0.152 0.351 0.619 0.819   
5 P_IE 0.114 0.192 0.417 0.501 0.775  
6 P_MP 0.099 0.100 0.403 0.416 0.485 0.793 
Notes: 
Diagonal elements are the square root of AVE statistics. Off-diagonal elements are the correlation 
between latent variables 
AVE: average variance extracted 
Variables: IMA - Involvement of management accountants; ICE_E - Effort effects; ICE_S - 
Selection effects; P_DP - Decision making processes; IE - Internal efficiency; MP - Market 
performance 
 
Table 10: Discriminant validity check  
 
 Constructs related to involvement of management accountants and to incentive 
compensation effects have been derived for our study. In order to further validate those 
instruments we sent questionnaires to HR managers of firms which have been participated in 
our research project. We selected HR managers due to their co-responsibility of remuneration 
systems. The resulting validation sample comprises 40 firms which should be a satisfactory 
amount. We embraced selected constructs in the questionnaire, especially the IMA construct 
that is assessed by management accountants in our study and the ICE constructs to validate 
the answers of general managers. For evaluating potential interrater biases we employed 
Mann-Whitney U-tests for every item of the selected constructs. Except for two items 
(ICE_S_1 and ICE_E_6) results of the tests did not indicate significant differences (p > 0.05) 
between the assessments of HR managers and the evaluations of management 
accountants/general managers. 
Finally, we also analyzed the constructs with those dyadic data sets we used to validate 
our research model. The first alternative data set (denoted as “Alternative model A”) consists 
of 49 companies with respondents maintaining the dominant role type “Advisor to 
management”. The second alternative data set (denoted as “Alternative model B”) embraces 
assessments of 34 companies with management accountants allocating most of their time to 
the dominant role type “Provider of advanced management accounting information”. We did 
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not set up a third data set since only 13 management accountants have been allocated to the 
role type “Provider of information for financial reporting purposes” resulting in an 
insufficient sample size to process PLS analyses. Thus, we analyzed the constructs with the 
two alternative data sets. Results in Table 11 suggest that reliability and validity of the 
instruments is also satisfactory and we can use the alternative data sets to assess the 
alternative structural models. 
Overall, results of our variable evaluation procedures exhibit sound operationalization 
of the measurement models and indicate no limitations for further analyses. 
 
Variable 
Alternative model A  Alternative model B 
CA CR AVE   CA CR AVE 
IMA 0.891 0.912 0.599  0.932 0.935 0.673 
ICE_E 0.887 0.913 0.602  0.907 0.925 0.640 
ICE_S 0.819 0.872 0.578  0.802 0.860 0.559 
P_DP 0.831 0.881 0.599  0.937 0.951 0.796 
P_IE 0.843 0.894 0.678  0.731 0.835 0.569 
P_MP 0.801 0.866 0.619  0.830 0.875 0.638 
        
N  49    34  
Notes: 
CA - Cronbach’s alpha; CR - composite reliability; AVE - average variance extracted  
Variables: IMA - Involvement of management accountants; ICE_E - Effort effects; ICE_S - 
Selection effects; P_DP - Decision making processes; IE - Internal efficiency; MP - Market 
performance 
 
Table 11: Assessment of variables – Alternative models  
 
4.3 Results of structural models 
For assessing the structural model and to test the hypotheses we rely on multiple squared 
correlations (R2), standardized -statistics used as path coefficients, significances of path 
coefficients, effect sizes (f2), and predictive relevance (Q2). Measures to evaluate the overall 
model fit are not available for PLS and mark a disadvantage compared to covariance-based 
SEM approaches. Procedures and results of our analysis are described below and are also 
depicted including selected details in Figure 2. This figure also points out our dyadic research 
design in which the construct on the involvement of management accountants in incentive 
compensation is assessed by management accountants and the constructs on controls as well 
as on performance is assessed by general managers. 
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 Maximization of variance is one of the key purposes of the PLS approach. For assessing 
this aspect multiple squared correlations, i.e., the R2 value of a dependent variable, are 
utilized. There is basically no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ R2 value since research question and design can 
influence this amount (Jain, 1994: 168). Despite this thought, we follow Chin (1998: 323) 
who labels a value of 67% as ‘substantial’, a value of 33% as ‘moderate’, and one of 19% as 
‘weak’. R2 statistics of our model are between 12.30% and 36.74%. We consider those 
amounts as satisfactory reflecting our research design and comparing them with results of 
other recent management accounting studies (e.g., Bouwens and van Lent, 2007; Homburg 
and Stebel, 2009; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007).  
 For hypotheses testing we evaluate the path coefficients, which should be at least > 0.1 
(Lohmöller, 1989: 60), and their significance. The significance of the path coefficients is 
determined by respective t-values which are derived from non-parametric resampling 
procedures. We employed bootstrapping using 500 samples with replacement. Each of the 
samples consisted of the same number of cases as our original data set, i.e., N = 113, for our 
main research model. Our first hypothesis predicted that when management accountants are 
more involved in the design and the operation of incentive compensation systems this should 
enhance the effort effects of the incentives with regard to direction, duration, and intensity of 
managerial activities. The empirical data support this hypothesis (H1:  = 0.210; t = 3.052; 
p < 0.01) and underpin the positive effects of an involvement of management accountants in 
responsibilities beyond their core tasks. This also supports the call for broader scopes of 
management accountants’ activities and roles since they can contribute to the effectiveness of 
the firm’s controls. The second hypothesis embraces the two constructs of incentive 
compensation effects. We predicted that there is a positive association between the selection 
and the effort effect. Our obtained empirical data lead us to corroborate the hypothesis (H2: 
 = 0.533; t = 6.976; p < 0.01). As presumed, the results of this hypothesis are stronger than 
the results of our first hypothesis underpinning the importance of managerial competencies. 
Our third hypothesis connects the incentive compensation effects elements with the 
performance dimension. Initially, we predicted a positive association between the ICE_E 
construct and the decision making processes. Empirical results show that the proposed 
relation is supported (H3:  = 0.351; t = 3.095; p < 0.01). The subsequent hypothesis on the 
performance path links decision making processes with internal efficiency. Reflecting the 
results we could also corroborate the fourth hypothesis (H4:  = 0.501; t = 7.032; p < 0.01). 
Finally, the last hypothesis of our research model proposes an association between internal 
efficiency and market performance. Empirical data suggest to confirm this hypothesis as well 
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(H5:  = 0.485; t = 8.684; p < 0.01). Overall, results are satisfactory since they are consistent 
with our expectations and all hypotheses of our main research model are corroborated.  
 After analyzing the path coefficients and corresponding significances we proceed with 
effect sizes as next element of our research agenda. The effect size (f2) is calculated to 
determine which of independent variables has a substantial impact on the dependent variable. 
It is only applicable, if there is more than one independent variable connected with the 
dependent variable. Effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 can be regarded as small, medium, and 
large effects (Chin, 1998: 316-17). Hence, we calculated effect sizes for the relations between 
IMA and ICE_E and between ICE_S and ICE_E. Results indicate a small effect for the 
former relation (f2 = 0.065) and a strong effect (f2 = 0.429) for the latter one. This result is 
generally consistent with our expectations. We assumed and could verify with the empirical 
data that involvement of management accountants has a significant impact on the effort 
effects of incentive compensation. Nevertheless, we are aware that effects which emanate 
from the ICE_S construct have presumably a stronger impact on ICE_E since ‘good’ 
managerial actions and decisions initially depend on the abilities of the managers whereas 
management accountants ‘only’ potentially enhance the controls.  
 The predictive relevance of each construct can be evaluated by the Stone-Geisser test 
criterion redundancy Q2. This criterion provides information to what extent the data set can be 
reconstructed by the structural model and the parameters. Redundancy Q2 values, which can 
be derived by the application of blindfolding procedures, larger than zero confirm predictive 
relevance (Chin, 1998: 317-18; Fornell and Cha, 1994: 71-3). All redundancy Q2 amounts of 
our research model meet this criterion as they are all above zero (ICE_E: 0.217, P_MP: 0.086, 
P_IE: 0.157, and P_MP: 0.124). 
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Figure 2: Results of structural model analysis (main research model)  
 
To validate the results we considered dominant role types of management accountants 
for our analysis. Since the assessment of measurement models based on the alternative data 
sets indicates sufficient results we are able to estimate two alternative structural models. 
Against this background, we conducted sub-group analyses suggested by Henseler et al. 
(2009: 309) and compared R2 statistics. Details on the evaluation of the three structural 
models are provided in Table 12 and Figure 3. 
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Variable Main research model Alternative model A Alternative model B 
 Path coef. t-value  Path coef. t-value  Path coef. t-value 
Description of path 
IMA  ICE_E 0.210 *** 3.052 0.405 *** 5.634 0.118 - 0.499 
ICE_S  ICE_E  0.533 *** 6.976 0.487 *** 4.720 0.508 *** 2.522 
ICE_E  P_DP 0.351 *** 3.095 0.526 *** 3.848 0.392 ** 1.999 
P_DP  P_IE 0.501 *** 7.032 0.594 *** 6.597 0.469 *** 3.546 
P_IE  P_MP 0.485 *** 8.684 0.454 *** 4.493 0.600 *** 8.471 
   
 
 
 
   
R2     
ICE_E 36.74% 55.30% 27.41% 
P_DP 12.30% 27.65% 15.40% 
P_IE 25.15% 35.33% 22.02% 
P_MP 23.53% 20.57% 36.04% 
   
 
 
 
   
N 113 49 34 
Notes: 
Variables: IMA - Involvement of management accountants; ICE_E - Effort effects; ICE_S - 
Selection effects; P_DP - Decision making processes; IE - Internal efficiency; MP - Market 
performance  
Significance level (two tailed): *** p < 0.01 (>2.586); ** p < 0.05 (>1.965); * p < 0.10 (>1.648)  
 
Table 12: Overview results structural models  
 
Results of the alternative models are in general satisfying and similar to those of the 
main research model. Differences are especially indicated for the relation between the IMA 
and the ICE_E construct. We conducted especially three comparisons: (i) the main research 
model with alternative model A, (ii) the main research model with alternative model B, and 
(iii) the two alternative models. Ad (i): alternative model A embracing answers of 
management accountants allocating most of their time to advisory tasks reveals a stronger 
effect of an involvement of management accountants on the effort effects of incentive 
compensation than the one of the main research model. Results of our sub-group analysis 
reveal a probability of 96.96% that the path coefficient of the alternative model A is larger 
than the path coefficient of our main research model. Ad (ii): Analyzing alternative model B, 
especially two aspects are of interest: First, there is no significant path for the relation 
between the involvement of management accountants and the effort effects of incentive 
compensation. Second, the comparison of this alternative model with our main research 
models shows only a probability of 57.56% that the path coefficient of the main research 
model is larger than the one of the alternative model. Ad (iii): Comparing the results of the 
two alternative models reveal different path coefficients and a probability that the path 
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 Figure 3: Results of structural model analysis (alternative models) 
 
coefficient of alternative model A is larger than the one of alternative model B of 89.49%. To 
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alternative model A and our main research model indicate a significant difference (p < 0.05); 
the other two comparisons do not show significant results of the sub-group analyses.  
Furthermore, the R2 values of the effort effect construct do also support this assessment 
as the highest amount is shown for alternative model A (R2 = 55.30%) and the lowest 
(R2 = 27.41%) for alternative model B. Overall, those observations and results lead to the 
conclusion that management accountants who predominantly act as an advisor to management 
obviously have a stronger impact on the effort effects of incentive compensation compared to 
management accountants which spend most of their time with providing information.  
 The results of our main research models as well as the alternative ones provide adequate 
support and indicate robustness of our hypotheses and expectations. The involvement of 
management accountants in incentive compensation enhances the effort effects of the 
incentive schemes and subsequently firm performance. Simultaneously, the selection effect 
has a stronger impact on the effort effect than the consequences resulting from an 
involvement of management accountants. Furthermore, the dominant role type of 
management accountants impacts the results. E.g., management accountants with the 
dominant role type as an advisor to management tend to be stronger involved and the 
structural model reveals stronger effects.  
 
5 Conclusion 
We conclude our study by revisiting and discussing our research questions, possible 
contributions, managerial implications, inherent limitations, and possible avenues for future 
research. 
 The aim of our study was to gain further insights and evidence of the postulated wider 
tasks of management accountants in the context of incentive compensation. Our research 
questions addressed two aspects: (i) to what extent are management accountants involved in 
design and operation of incentive compensation systems; and (ii) what is the impact of this 
involvement on effects of incentive compensation and subsequently firm performance? Our 
results allow us to provide answers to our research questions as well as to reaffirm the 
importance of management accountants’ roles in organizations. In particular, the findings 
indicate that management accountants are indeed involved in incentive compensation. 
Furthermore, we are able to provide indications of a possible positive impact of an 
involvement of management accountants on incentive compensation effects and firm 
performance. Management accountants provide adequate performance measures and 
participate in further activities concerning incentive compensation. Accordingly, their 
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involvement might reduce the risk of problems with not aligned incentive compensation 
systems. Our findings do also reveal that a dominant role type of management accountants 
might influence the results. For instance, management accountants who deem themselves 
more as an advisor to management and prioritize consulting activities might be more involved 
in extended activities and may contribute more to the achievement of corporate objectives. 
 Our research activities may contribute to management accounting literature in several 
ways. The results provide further evidence on the changing and expanding roles of 
management accountants by showing that their task bundle does also embrace responsibilities 
which lie beyond their core activities as information provider. Furthermore, our findings 
illustrate that management accountants may contribute to organizational objectives and, in 
particular, that such an involvement is positively associated with the effects of controls as 
well as firm performance. In addition, we may contribute to literature with the expansion of 
existing research instruments and the development of new instruments to measure the 
involvement of management accountants in incentive compensation or the effects of control 
mechanisms. Reliability and validity statistics of those instruments revealed satisfactory 
results and may serve as basis for future research activities. Finally, whereas other research in 
this field had to rely on smaller sample sizes we have been able to use a quite large dyadic 
data set.  
 The results of our study might also have implications for business practice. They 
encourage management accountants to contribute to their organization in broader areas and 
play a part in responsibilities beyond their core tasks. Management accountants should 
propose and signal to general management that they have the aptitudes as well as the 
resources for additional activities. If the general managers’ perception of the competencies of 
management accountants improves, general managers might allocate wider tasks to 
management accountants. But, such an involvement requires adequate competencies of the 
respective job holders and their departmental co-workers. Whereas some management 
accountants might exhibit relevant expertise, there might also be management accountants 
requiring proper training. Beside individual training programs, corporations should amend 
their HR development curriculum accordingly and include, for instance, programs on 
effective communication and business skills in the specific schedules for management 
accountants.   
 Our study is also subject to potential limitations which go beyond those typically related 
to the application of questionnaire-based surveys (e.g., reduced flexibility, limited possibility 
to answer queries from respondents). First, we implicitly assume that higher involvement of 
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management accountants is always associated with an increase of the quality of provided 
services. Taking the discussion of possible concerns of extended tasks of management 
accountants into account, e.g., reduced objectivity due to a higher involvement in managerial 
decision making, this aspect might reduce the validity of our results. Second, even if our 
survey instruments exhibit sound reliability and validity statistics, we are aware that newly 
developed scales are subject to potential limitations and should be validated in future research 
initiatives. The instruments should be further discussed and developed in order to demonstrate 
appropriateness and to ensure that they capture the relevant subjects. Third, we derive the 
dominant role types of management accountants by allocating their working time to the 
specific roles. This possibly naïve approach of deducting the dominant roles might be an 
origin for a possible limitation and should be replaced by a more sophisticated approach in 
future research activities. Fourth, our response rate is lower than desired. Nevertheless, it 
deemed acceptable reflecting the complex research design and the growing number of firms 
with a policy not to participate in survey research. Referring to those possible limitations, any 
generalizations must be made with caution. But, in spite of those caveats, we still believe that 
our results may contribute to management accounting literature and may serve as one exhibit 
for management accounting on its way to regain and assure relevance. 
Several insights and findings on roles and tasks of management accountants in the 
context of incentive compensation emerge from our study. But, our results do also leave room 
for future scholarly activities. Whereas other studies analyzed the involvement of 
management accountants in management in general our study addresses the particular aspect 
of incentive compensation. Future research activities to reaffirm extended tasks and 
responsibilities of management accountants could analyze an involvement of management 
accountants in other areas which do also not belong to the core activities of management 
accountants. Those could, for instance, embrace corporate functions like marketing or 
procurement to which management accountants could contribute. Moreover, additional 
research is required to better understand the causality of activities of management 
accountants, effects of control mechanisms, and performance. Since survey data obtained 
from cross-sectional studies do not provide clear evidence on this link it would be beneficial 
to conduct longitudinal studies in this context. Those studies might embrace survey or in-
depth case-based research initiatives analyzing aspects like the role and the long-term effects 
of an involvement of management accountants during re-design or new implementation of 
incentive systems in organizations. Furthermore, our research design only focused on one 
country. It might be illuminating to administer a research project across different countries to 
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gain further insights into possible country-specific characteristics. This would also be in line 
with research conducted in different countries on changing roles of management accountants 
(e.g., Sathe, 1982; Byrne and Pierce, 2007; Zoni and Merchant, 2007; Granlund and Lukka, 
1998) or national differences in compensation practices (e.g., Jansen et al., 2009). Finally, 
future research could also validate and further develop the instruments we applied in our 
project. This should foremost be beneficial for the instrument to capture the dominant role 
type of management accountants. A more sophisticated instrument could for instance also 
embrace determinants of the dominant roles like personal characteristics and skills of the 
management accountants which could be linked to the extent of the involvement of 
management accountants in incentive compensation. 
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Appendix
The appendix contains detailed item descriptions of the employed variables. 
 
Label Item 
IMA_1 Management accountants are involved in conceptual issues regarding incentive compensation 
IMA_2 Performance measures implemented in control systems are utilized as performance indicator for variable compensation schemes 
IMA_3 Changes in control systems or processes are followed by adjustments of incentive compensation systems 
IMA_4 Expertise of management accountants is taken into account in case of amendments of incentive compensation systems 
IMA_5 Management accountants regularly provide information required for incentive compensation systems, e.g., financial performance measures 
IMA_6 Management accountants are asked for advice in case of queries related to performance measures and corresponding influencing factors 
IMA_7 Management accountants and HR managers actively collaborate on tasks related to incentive compensation  
Notes: 
6-point rating scale, anchors: 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
 
Table 13: Item description – “Involvement of management accountants (IMA)” 
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Label Item 
ICE_E - Incentive compensation effects_Effort effect 
ICE_E_1 Different decisions would often be taken without the incentive compensation 
ICE_E_2 Incentive compensation causes decisions in line with our companies targets 
ICE_E_3 Managers of our company are motivated by the application of incentive compensation 
ICE_E_4 Incentive compensation schemes support the pursuit of our company’s long term goals 
ICE_E_5 The application of incentive compensation influences the behavior of managers 
ICE_E_6 Managers consider possible effects in their incentive compensation during decisions 
ICE_E_7 Overall, the application of incentive compensation implies a control effect 
ICE_S - Incentive compensation effects_Selection effect 
ICE_S_1 Our company is an attractive employer at the market 
ICE_S_2 Compensation of our managers is market orientated 
ICE_S_3 Changes in our annual wage expense are in a proper relation to changes in our performance 
ICE_S_4 Manager recruited in the last two to three years ‘fit’ our company  
ICE_S_5 Good managers remain with our company and do not leave toward to our competitors 
Notes: 
6-point rating scale, anchors: 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
 
Table 14: Item description – “Incentive compensation effectiveness (ICE)”  
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Label Item 
P_DP - Performance_Decision making processes 
 Managers of our company are satisfied with … 
P_DP_1 … the information basis for important decisions 
P_DP_2 … the process of decision making 
P_DP_3 … the results of important decisions 
P_DP_4 … the course of actions after important decisions 
P_DP_5 … the monitoring of important decisions 
P_IE - Performance_Internal efficiency 
P_IE_1 Realization of cost reduction potentials  
P_IE_2 Efficient resource allocation 
P_IE_3 Cost awareness  
P_IE_4 Enhancement of internal processes 
P_MP - Performance_Market performance 
P_MP_1 Profitability 
P_MP_2 Market share 
P_MP_3 Growth 
P_MP_4 Size 
Notes: 
6-point rating scale, anchors (P_DP): 1 - do not agree at all; 6 - totally agree 
6-point rating scale, anchors (P_IE; P_MP): 1 - much worse ; 6 - much better (compared with 
competitor) 
 
Table 15: Item description – “Performance (P)”  
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